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WORKING PAPER No. 1/2009 
China’s Energy Situation and Its Implications in the New Millennium 
 
1. Overview 
Understanding China’s energy economy in the new millennium is crucial for politicians, 
business people and energy economists. In particular, China’s energy policy directions 
will present both challenges and opportunities to the World in terms of an increasing share 
of primary energy consumption and investment opportunities (Wang, 1995; CIAB, 1999). 
China’s industrialization, modernization and urbanization affect the way in which energy 
resources will be developed as the basis of economic growth (Dean, 1974).  
        Many authors have focused on the energy situation in China (Dean, 1974; Dorian 
and Clark, 1987; Kambara, 1992; Wu and Li, 1995; Smil, 1998; CIAB, 1999), however, 
many energy related issues in China still remain unanswered, for example, what are the 
potential forces driving energy demand; what are the potential forces driving energy 
supply? Previous reviews focused only on fossil fuel based energy and ignored other 
important elements including renewable and ‘clean’ energy sources. Therefore, a 
comprehensive and complete review of the energy situation in China is timely and 
necessary. The work presented here is intended to fill this gap by bringing the research on 
fossil-based and renewable energy economic studies together and identifying the potential 
drivers behind both energy demand and supply to provide a complete picture of China’s 
energy situation in the new millennium.  This will be of interest to anyone concerned with 
the development of China’s economy in general and the energy economy, in particular.  
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       This review of China’s energy situation is organized as follows.  Firstly, we consider 
the historical origins of China’s current energy situation. This is followed by an 
investigation and analysis of China’s energy resources, including renewable energy. In the 
third section we consider the energy industrial regulations. Section 4 focuses on capacity 
building in the energy sector. Sections 5 and 6 describe energy transportation (focusing on 
coal) and energy price information. Section 7 discusses China’s energy efficiency in 
particular, energy intensity over time and across regions.  This is followed by a discussion 
of energy supply, demand and trade. Section 9 discusses the potential factors driving 
demand and supply. The final section provides some areas for potential policy initiatives 
in the Chinese energy market and issues relevant for economic development, more widely. 
1.1 An historical perspective of China’s energy situation 
As early as 1974, Dean considered the energy situation in the People’s Republic of China 
and argued that the discovery and initial exploration of new petroleum reserves were 
significant changes to energy policy and operation. In particular, he was concerned with 
future developments in the energy industry and the effect on the international energy 
market. He argued that the size of China’s fossil fuel and hydroelectric resources, 
combining with the commitment to ‘self-reliance’ made it unlikely that China would 
become a major energy importer. Furthermore, he argued that China would likely become 
a major exporter in the foreseeable future. By 1992 China had, in fact, become a major 
energy importer.  
         Dorian and Clark (1987) discussed potential supply problems and implications for 
China’s energy resources. They stated that primary energy production must increase 
 5
significantly by the year 2000 if China was to achieve its current modernization and 
economic objectives. To support and sustain this rapid economic growth, indigenous 
supplies of primary energy resources would have to be developed at rates greater than 
those of the time. With a specific concern for China’s sustainable energy supplies, they 
conducted a systematic assessment of China’s primary energy resources by Province 
using the Unit Regional Production Value (URPV) technique, originally developed by 
Griffiths (1978). What is interesting is that they present the potential for petroleum, 
natural gas, coal and uranium by Province. In the Appendix we present three figures for 
petroleum, natural gas and coal (see Appendix Figures 1-3) - for detailed URPV see 
Dorian and Clark (1987). Once they had identified the potential supply of petroleum, 
natural gas and coal by Province they consider the extent to which exploration is restricted 
by outdated equipment and poor management. Furthermore, they consider whether 
increased energy production may be limited by inadequate infrastructure combined with 
high capital requirements, safety and environmental issues.  
       Kambara (1992) investigated China’s energy situation in the 1980s. He considered 
economic growth and energy consumption and, in turn, the energy intensity by sector and 
by region, observing the changing patterns of energy supply and demand. He then, raised 
a number of issues, including the unequal distribution of energy reserves, rising 
investment cost, limited funds and lack of technology imports which he believed have 
constrained China’s energy supplies. He stated that his review of China’s energy situation 
suggests that supplies of, and demand for, energy will grow in a ‘balanced fashion’ that 
will keep pace with economic development. Finally, he argued that the most important 
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task facing China was to totally reform the energy market, particularly pricing to 
eliminate wasted generation caused by low energy prices. The current ‘partialy 
liberalized’ market, he argued, actually caused more confusion than benefits. 
        Wu and Li (1995) studied developments in China’s energy situation in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. They described commercial energy production and consumption and stated 
that certain features of China’s energy production and consumption have had a profound 
impact on the country’s energy development strategies and policies. Much of their work, 
therefore, focused on explaining these strategies and policies in China, fuel by fuel. 
Overall, they present two basic characteristics of China’s energy industry associated with 
China’s policies for energy development. The first is that China’s energy policy has 
varied over the last several decades consistent with domestic and international situation. 
The second is that China does not have a unified national energy development strategy as 
energy resources are not all substitutes and the distribution of energy resources is uneven 
across regions or Provinces. As a result the ‘national’ energy policies have become de 
facto ‘regional energy development policies’ with each of the major energy industries 
developing their own strategies. In conclusion the authors recommend that China offer; 
more flexible terms to attract foreign investment in the energy sector; formulate a 
comprehensive oil import policy;  improve the legislative and business climate to support 
fair competition; ensure balanced growth of coal production and transportation;  limit the 
monopoly power of railway transportation through government intervention, and finally 
reform electricity pricing   
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        There is abundance of coal and the lack of natural gas in China, where coal 
extraction originates from two types of enterprises - large collieries owned by the state 
and administrated from Beijing and a variety of local medium and small mines run by 
counties, townships, collectives and even individuals (Wang, 2007). It is a common 
phenomenon in China that growth in output has not been accompanied by improvements 
in quality. Attempts to open small mines, without geological and technical evaluation, has 
led to a significant waste of coal resources. Primitive extraction methods and 
inexperienced operators have led to a very low recovery rate and often extensive 
destruction of arable and grazing land. Rapid economic expansion and the continuing 
reliance on coal can be expected to more than double China’s current carbon dioxide 
emissions are forecast to rise significantly with a large increase in the other greenhouse 
gases (Smil, 1998; Liang, Fan and Wei, 2007). 
        It is very surprising that the reviews summarized above have not been mentioned any 
renewable energy at all given that renewable energy has been playing an important role in 
China’s energy supply. China’s population is over 1.2 billion where more than 60% live 
in rural areas where most of households use renewable energy (e.g., biomass, biogas) 
rather than fossil fuel based energy (Liu et al., 2008; Zhou et al., 2008). For example, 
since 2000 renewable energy has accounted for approximately 74% of China’s total rural 
residential energy consumption (CESY, 2007). Meanwhile, China’s urbanization is 
gradually reshaping the pattern of rural energy consumption away from biomass energy-
based to cleaner energy sources (Cai and Jiang, 2008). This will undoubtedly lead to more 
pressure on nonrenewable energy demand. 
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        The energy situation in China is highly dynamic. Do the concerns raised above 
persist? Did China follow the policies suggested above? What does the current energy 
situation in China look like? Are there any new concerns that have appeared? Are there 
any new policies that have been proposed? The following Section presents an overview of 
the current energy situation in China. 
 
 2. China’s energy resources 
 The issue of China’s energy reserves is of long standing interest to researchers and policy 
makers.  Issues related to general energy reserves can be found in BP (2008) and energy 
potential in Dorian and Clark (1987). Here we present three figures to illustrate China’s 
energy reserves and their distribution over Provinces as it helps understand issues related 
to energy transportation and policies on energy exploration and regional development.  
2.1 Coal reserves 
China’s proven reserves of anthracite and bituminous coal are 62200 million metric 
tonnes (mmt) and for sub-bituminous and lignite coal, 52300 mmt (BP, 2008). The total 
proven coal reserves are therefore 114500 mmt and account for 13.5% of total world 
stocks. As of the end of 2007, the ratio of reserves to production is 118 years. It is also 
widely known that China’s distribution of coal is extremely uneven across regions. Figure 
1 shows the distribution of China’s coal reserves by Province in 2004. Coal is found 
almost everywhere in China, but the major deposits are found in the North (Shanxi and 
Neimeng), Southwest (Guizhou and Yunnan) and Northwest (Shaanxi). Most coal 
reserves are located in Shanxi Province (over 100 billion metric tons). 
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2.2 Petroleum reserves 
 Statistics show a clear decline in China’s proven and recoverable petroleum reserves. In 
1987 there were 2377 mmt declining to 2322 mmt by the end of 1997 and 2117 mmt by 
2008. Chinese petroleum reserves presently account for 1.3% of the world total (BP, 
2008). As of the end 2007, the ratio of reserves to production was 11.3 years. Finding new 
oil fields and creating a comprehensive oil import policy package is one of the most 
important tasks for China to undertake. Similarly, oil reserves are not evenly distributed 
over Provinces see (Figure 2), which shows stocks in favor of Northeast (Heilongjiang), 
East (Jiangsu) and Northwest (Xinjiang). 
2.3 Natural gas reserves 
 China’s proven reserves of natural gas are 1.9 trillion cubic meters and account for 1.1% 
of the world total. As of the end 2007, the ratio of reserves to production is 27.2. Natural 
gas reserves are mainly located in Southwest (Sichuan and Chongqing), West (Shaanxi), 
North (Neimeng) and Northwest (Xinjiang) (see Figure 3). There are two types of natural 
gas reserves – those which are independent of oil fields and those associated with oil 
reserves. Natural gas development is sluggish due to the absence of production facilities, 
transportation pipelines and urban gas supply systems. Nevertheless, China’s natural gas 
resources are estimated to be large and more will no doubt be confirmed and developed. 
The most promising fields are in the Ordos basin, the Caidam Basin, and the Yinggehai 
Basin off Hainan Island (Smil, 1992). 
2.4 Renewable energy  
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 There are various renewable energy sources including hydropower, biomass, solar energy, 
wind energy, geothermal energy and wave energy currently used in China. It is currently 
estimated that the economically potential exploitable renewable energy resources amount 
to approximately 7.2 billion tonnes coal equivalent, while the current exploited renewable 
energy resource is only 0.1 billion tonnes coal equivalent (Zhou, 2006). Here we will 
consider only hydropower and biomass renewable energy as they are currently two of the 
most important sources of renewable energy in China.    
2.4.1 Hydropower energy 
China is rich in hydropower energy potential. Maximum exploitable hydropower 
resources are approximately 680 million KW1, of which 380-400 million KW is currently 
economic exploitable potential. To date, there has been total installed capacity of 116 
million KW. China plans to install new capacity of 165 million KW by 2010 and 290 
million KW by 2020. 
        Of 380-400 million KW of hydropower economic exploitable, there is 128 million 
KW from small hydropower stations (under 50,000 KW), located in 1600 countries across 
the country. Total installed capacity of small hydropower stations was 47 million KW in 
2006. Total generation of rural hydropower was 148 billion KWh in 2006 (CSY, 2007). 
China plans to install 50 million KW by 2010 and 75 million KW by 2020 for small 
hydropower station generation (Zhou, 2006). 
                                                 
1 This unit (KW) comes from China Energy Statistical Yearbook 2007, which only indicates the installed capacity 
without providing much hydroelectricity generated annually. 
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         Small hydropower stations play an important role in China’s rural electricity supply. 
Currently, approximately half of the territories, one third of counties and a quarter of the 
total population are dependent upon small-scale hydropower for rural electricity supply.  
        The distribution of small-scale hydropower generation, however, is uneven. 
Approximately 65% of small hydropower stations are located in the west and south of the 
country. In 2005, total installed capacity was approximately 24.7 million KW in the 
western areas of the country, which generated total hydro electricity of 71.5 billion KWh.  
2.4.2 Biomass energy 
Potential for biomass energy in China includes crop stalks, firewood, foul waste, domestic 
garbage, industrial organic wastes and waste water, etc. It is estimated that total potential 
biomass energy is approximately 70-100 mmt coal equivalent, of which 50% comes from 
crop stalks, i.e., 35-50 mmt coal equivalent (Zhang et al., 2008 in Press).   
         During the period 1995-2006, China produced approximately 620 million tons of 
crop stalks per year of which 50% comes from the east and central south of China. Crop 
residues amount to 1.3 times total crop output and 2 times that of the total fodder of 
grassland. Crop stalks of corn, wheat and rice amounted to 189, 136 and 237 million tons 
respectively accounting for over 85% of all crop stalks in 2006 (CSY, 2007).  At present, 
energy use accounts for approximately 37.5% of crop stalks, non-energy use accounts for 
approximately 27.5% of crop stalks with approximately 35.0% of crop stalks either lost 
during the harvest or discarded in the field (Liu et al., 2008). This means that there is still 
35% potential use of crop stalks as biomass energy in China’s rural areas equivalent to 
over 50 mmt coal equivalent.  
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3. Energy industry decentralization 
Before proceeding with this section, we list some government departments, agencies, 
administration, and large energy enterprises relevant to energy industry regulation and 
definition of their abbreviations in order as they appear.  
• SPC - State Planning Commission, since 1952 and replaced by SDPC in 1998 
• SDPC - State Development and Planning Commission, replaced by SDRC in 2003 
• SDRC - State Development and Reform Commission, taking place of the former 
SDPC and incorporating partial functions of SETC and the former State Economy 
and Institution Reform Office. 
• SETC - State Economic and Trade Commission, replaced by Ministry of 
Commerce (MOC) in 2003. 
• MOC - Ministry of Commerce, since 2003 combining the former SETC and the 
former Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Corporation. 
• SSTC - State Sciences and Technology Commission, since 1958 and replaced by 
MST in 1998. 
• MST - Ministry of Sciences and Technology, since March 1998 replacing the 
former SSTC. 
• CNPC - China National Petroleum Corporation 
• Sinopec - China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
• MEP - Ministry of Electric Power  
• MCI - Ministry of Coal Industries 
• SAPC - State Administration of Petroleum Corporation 
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• SACI – State Administration of Coal Industry 
• CGOM - central government owned mines 
• PGOM - Provincial government owned mines 
• LGOM - local government-owned mines 
• TVOM - Town- and village-owned mines 
• SPCC – State Petroleum Corporation of China 
• MLR - Ministry of Land and Resource 
• MOE - Ministry of Energy 
• VISOU - Vertically Integrated State-Owned Utilities 
• SPC - State Power Corporation 
• SPG - State Power Grid 
• CSPG - China Southern Power Grid 
• SERC - State Electricity Regulatory Commission 
• CTCE - China Taiyuan Coal Exchange, since June 2007. 
• SEA - State Energy Administration, within SDRC since July 2008.  
Previous regulatory system 
China’s energy industry has experienced several significant policy and management 
changes. The ‘old form’ of energy industry regulation system was created in 1993. Figure 
4 shows the government structure and regulatory system as it was. The State Planning 
Commission (SPC, now called the State Development and Reform Commission - SDRC) 
reported to the State Council which stood at the top of the energy policy hierarchy with 
full responsibility for energy policy. The State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC, 
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from which most functions have been transferred to the SDRC since 2001) and the State 
Sciences and Technology Commission (SSTC, now the Ministry of Sciences and 
Technology) played a relatively minor and subordinate role in the energy sector. Under 
this old system, each of the major energy industries was dominated by a single institution 
which was either a State Corporation or a Ministry. For example, the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) dominated petroleum exploration and production, while 
the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) controlled oil refining and 
distribution. The Ministry of Electric Power (MEP) and Ministry of Coal Industries (MCI) 
were in charge of the power and coal sectors, respectively. These Corporations and 
Ministries were also involved in policy formulation, regulation and enterprise 
management (Andrews-Speed, Dow and Gao, 2000).  
       The old industrial organization structure and regulatory system of China’s energy 
sector have been well documented and reviewed, for example, energy policies prior to the 
1970s were reviewed by Dean (1974). National policies and regional strategies of China’s 
energy development were considered by Wu and Li (1995). The changes in China’s 
power sector in the early 1990s were discussed by Li and Dorian (1995). China’s energy 
and resource use during the first part of the 1990s were assessed by Smil (1998). China’s 
reform of the coal industry during the 1980s and the early 1990s were reviewed by 
Thomson (1996) and CIAB (1999). Decentralization of China’s electricity sector in the 
1980s was considered in Wirtshafter and Shih (1990). The reform of China’s electric 
power industry and the foreign direct investment were discussed by Andrews-Speed and 
Dow (2000) and Blackman and Wu (1999), respectively.  
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The New Regulatory System 
The most important reform of the energy sector was implemented in 1998.  These changes 
included a strategic reorganization of petroleum enterprises establishing a new vertically 
integrated management system for the oil industry. In 2002, China’s power industry 
involved the separation of government functions from those of enterprises and the 
separation of power plants from lines operation. Figure 5 illustrates the most recent 
government structure and regulatory system identifying the post-1998 situation (Wu, 
2003). The new structure is based upon three main goals: i) removing government from 
the function of enterprise management; ii) extending market-orientated energy system 
reform; iii) improving the efficiency of the energy industry (IOSC, 2007). However, the 
key questions, as stressed by Andrews-Speed, Dow and Gao (2000) are the future 
function of the SETC, two new energy bureaus (SAPC - State Administration of 
Petroleum Corporation, and SACI – State Administration of Coal Industry) and the new 
Department for the power industry (SPCC – State Petroleum Corporation of China). 
According to Wu, (2003), their future functions seem unclear  
The regulation of the coal industry  
The coal industry has been free of single corporation domination since the 1990s because 
of two natural features that constrain the development of China’s coal industry. Firstly, 
most of China’s coal reserves are in the north and far from coastal consumption regions 
and secondly, there is little rainfall in the main coal producing area. These two features 
make it a high priority for government to improve the transportation network and to 
enhance transport capacity. More importantly, coal is in surplus supply, in fact, the coal 
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industry has often suffered from oversupplying. As a result, the government has often 
acquiescenced to coal production from various mines during periods of shortage and 
issued quotas during periods of excess supply (Wang, 2007). 
        The reform to the coal industry took a crucial step towards decentralization and 
disaggregation when the MCI was dismantled and replaced by the SACI, a newly created 
section within the SETC. Since 1999 the ownership and operation of central government 
owned mines (CGOM) has been transferred to the Provinces. Today, three main types of 
coal producers exist in  China: i) Approximately 100 Provincial government owned mines 
(PGOM) which were transferred from the CGOM all of which  are large scale with an 
annual output of 10 mmt; ii) Previously local government-owned mines (LGOM), 
including Provincial government owned mines; and iii) town- and village-owned mines 
(TVOM) and private owned mines. According to Huang (2006), there were 21,000 small 
mines in the LGOM, TVOM and private enterprises in 2005. 
        It is clear that under the new government structure and regulatory system there are no 
mines owned at the state level and all mines are owned and operated at and below the 
Provincial level. Consequently, the SACI is left as a purely regulatory body within 
government (Figure 5) responsible for both policy and regulation together with its 
Provincial equivalents. Correspondingly, the SDPC is likely to retain some control over 
major investment decisions and the Ministry of Land and Resource (MLR) is likely to 
take overall responsibility for coal licensing. 
The regulation of the petroleum industry  
As discussed above, prior to 1998 China’s petroleum industry was controlled by two state 
companies: CNPC and Sinopec, both of which combined the roles of government and 
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enterprise management. However, after the 1998 strategic reorganization, the government 
functions of the petroleum sector were removed from the state companies and placed with 
SETC (Figure 5). The assets of both CNPC and Sinopec were redistributed to create two 
regional, vertically integrated companies that spanned the full range of activities in the 
petroleum industry. The CNPC and Sinopec have now become ‘pure’ companies. The 
CNPC’s territory covers the north and west of the country, while Sinopec’s territory now 
lies in the south and east. Their previous government functions have now been assigned to 
SAPC, a newly created agency within SETC. 
         It appears from Figure 5 that all companies in the petroleum industry are regulated 
directly by the SAPC within the SETC. Petroleum prices and transportation are regulated 
by two subdivisions, the Price Administration Division and Transportation Energy 
Division, within the SDPC. The MLR is responsible for issuing licenses. 
Regulation of the power industry: 
Prior to 1985, China’s electricity industry was under the control of central government 
(Wang, 2007). The generation, transmission, distribution and retailing of electricity were 
all within the administration of the Ministry of Water and Power Industry. However, the 
power industry has experienced a series of changes since 1985 (Xu and Chen, 2006). In 
1988 the Ministry of Coal Industry, the Ministry of Oil Industry, the Ministry of Nuclear 
Industry and the Ministry of Water and Power were merged into a newly created Ministry 
of Energy (MOE), which was disbanded in 1993. This highly centralized power 
administration system didn’t change fundamentally until 1997. However, during the 
interim, guidelines to separate the responsibilities of government and business were 
produced and provincial Bureaus of Electric Power were given some operational 
automony with local governmental jurisdiction over the development of the local power 
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industry. The aim of these changes was to encourage investment in the power sector and 
promote the generation of electricity.  
         To free the sector of government intervention and create Vertically Integrated State-
Owned Utilities (VISOU), the State Power Corporation (SPC) was created in March 1997. 
One year later, the Ministry of Electric Power was dismantled and its administrative 
functions assigned to a new department of the SETC.  
The 1997-2002 reforms were mainly focused on the separation of government and 
enterprise as well as the separation of ownership and operation. However, the newly 
created SPC became another monopolist controlling 50% of the country’s generation 
assets and most of the technology and development assets. As a result, it became a major 
obstacle to the development of a market-oriented power industry (Ma and He, 2008). 
        An important component of the market-oriented power reform process was to 
dismantle the SPC. In December 2002 its assets were divided into 11 new corporations, 
including two grid operators: the State Power Grid (SPG) and the China Southern Power 
Grid (CSPG),2  five Independent Power Plants (The Big Five): Huaneng Group, Datang 
Group, Huadian Corporation, Guodian Corporation and Power Investment Corporation, 
and four auxiliary corporations: Power Generation Consulting Group Corporation; 
Hydropower Engineering Consulting Group Corporation; Hydraulic and Hydroelectric 
Construction Consulting Group Corporation and Gezhouba Group Corporation. The 
generation and transmission assets were not distributed among the 11 new corporations, 
but were directly managed and controlled by State Power Grid until 2006. Since then, 
                                                 
2 State Power Grid includes five regional grids: Northwestern Grid, North Grid, Northeastern Grid, Central 
Grid, and East Grid and also referring to Figure 7. 
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those assets have been purchased by the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC). 
Therefore, the regulatory framework has become one where the SDRC is responsible for 
planning, price, investment and regulation; the SERC is an independent regulator, and at 
the bottom (see Figure 5) are the various enterprises. For more on the detailed reforms of 
China’s power industry refers Wu (2003), Xu and Chen (2006), Wang (2007), and Ma 
and He (2008).  
      China Taiyuan Coal Exchange (CTCE) in Taiyuan was approved by State Council to 
be setup on 18 June 2007 to replace the coal ordering meeting between coal producers and 
power producers (CTCE, 2007). The toughest reform in China’s energy industry has been 
settled since then. State Energy Administration (SEA), a division of State Development 
and Reform Commission, was established in July 2008. All these probably foresee that a 
full competitive energy market system has started to operate in China. 
 
4. Capacity building in the energy sector 
Strong economic growth and rising income per capita have produced an increasing 
demand for energy. Therefore, the development of the energy industry has become an 
important item on the agenda of the Chinese government. Enhancing energy production is 
one element of meeting the demand for energy in China. Since the 1990s, China has 
invested significantly in increasing the capacity of the energy sector and, as a result, total 
new energy capacity has increased. 
          Table 1 shows the change in capacity building for coal, crude oil and electricity. . In 
the 1990s, the newly increased capacity in coal extraction was, on average, only 23 mmt, 
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which only accounted for 1.8% of the current year raw coal production. With rapidly 
increasing investment, however the newly increased capacity of coal extraction reached, 
on average, 100 mmt, accounting for nearly 5.5% of current year raw coal production in 
the 2000s. The same pattern can be observed for crude oil extraction for example, the 
newly increased capacity of crude oil extraction averaged 9.3 mmt, accounting for 5.5% 
of current year crude oil production in the 1990s. Both doubled in the 2000s, reaching 
18.9 mmt and 10.8%, respectively. 
          In the 1990s, newly installed capacity in coal powered plants was, on average, 11.5 
million KW, being 6.4% of current year total installed capacity of coal powered plants 
nationwide. By the 2000s, newly installed capacity at coal powered plants reached 35.4 
million KW, accounting for nearly 10% of current year total installed capacity of coal 
powered plants. Between 1993 and 1999, newly installed capacity at hydropowered 
stations was 4.9 million KW per year, while the newly installed capacity nearly doubled 
each year in the 2000s. Since 1992, the new  capacity has been maintained at 
approximately 10% of current year total installed capacity for hydropower generation.  
         After observing the patterns of growth in capacity building in the energy industry, it 
can be noted that the growth of production capacity in raw coal extraction was slower 
than in crude oil extraction and electricity generation by coal powered plants and 
hydropower stations in China. Clearly the percentage of new capacity in current year total 
production capacity is only approximately 5% of raw coal extraction while it is closer to 
10% in the other three energy sectors.  
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        China’s capacity building in the energy sector is, in general, able to meet its 
aggregate energy demand. However, there are significant differences across energy 
sources. For example, from 2000 to 2006, China’s capacity for coal extraction averaged 
1725 mmt, but its coal consumption only increased 179 mmt each year in the same period. 
Therefore, China actually ran a surplus of coal capacity building. Likewise, oil capacity 
building was 172 mmt each year from 2000 to 2006, but its actual increase in oil 
consumption was only 22 mmt in the same period.  
 
5. Energy transportation 
Uneven distribution of energy production and consumption across Provinces has 
produced pressure on the domestic transportation sector .This is particularly true for coal 
which accounts for 75% of total production where coal is consumed throughout China.  
       Inter-Provincial total shipment of coal is 2394 mmt, which amounts to 1820 billion 
metric tonnes km, and accounts for 75% of total rail cargo in 2006. Of total 
interprovincial coal shipments in 2006, outflows of coal accounted for 40% (993 mmt), 
and inflows 60%, (1400 mmt). Because of the uneven production and special types of coal, 
there are significant variations across Province in the volume of total interprovincial coal 
shipment. Table 2 presents data on the outflows and inflows of coal and the percentage of 
total coal shipped in total coal consumption. As can be seen from Table 2 Shanxi, 
Neimeng, Henan and Shaanxi are major Provinces which export coal, 432, 145, 83 and 80 
mmt respectively in 2006, (column 1). Major Provinces importing coal are Shandong, 
Hebei, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, where the total inflows were 188, 173, 158 and 112 mmt, 
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respectively (column 2). Due to the uneven distribution of production and types of coal, 
total coal shipments in Shanxi Province amounted to 470 mmt being more than 150% of 
its total consumption within the Province in 2006 (columns 3 and 4). Total coal shipments 
were 200 mmt or 75% of total coal consumption within the Province of Hebei. There are 
several other Provinces where total coal shipments range from 110-160 mmt (Neimeng, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Henan).  
        A major feature of interprovincial coal shipments in China is that coal is shipped 
from West to East and from North to South.  These flows are shown in Figure 6.  In 
particular, West-East includes: 1) Datong (in Shanxi Province) to Qinhuangdao (in Hebei 
Province); 2) Shenmu (in Shanxi Province) to Huanghua port (in Hebei Province); 3) 
Taiyuan (in Shanxi Province) to Dezhou (in Shandong Province); 4) Changzhi (in 
Shanxin Province) by Jinan to Qingdao; and 5) Houma (in Shanxi Province) by Yueshan 
(in Henan Province), Xinxiang and Yanzhou (in Shandong Province) to Rizhao. North to 
South includes: 1) Harbin (in Heilongjiang Province) by Shenyang (in Liaoning Province), 
Dalian and Shanghai to Guangzhou (in Guangdong Province), including both railway and 
boats; 2) Tanjing by Jinan, Xuzhou (in Jiangsu Province) and Nanjing to Shanghai, 
including both railway and boats; 3) Datong (in Shanxi Province) by Taiyuan, Jiaozhuo 
(in Henan Province), Zhicheng (Hubei) and Liuzhou (in Guangxi Province) to Zhanjiang 
(in Guangdong Province); and 4) Baotou (in Shanxi Province) by Xian (Shaanxi) and 
Ankang (in Sichuan Province) to Chengdu. 
        The largest coal producer in China is in Shanxi Province where most coal is shipped 
to Hebei, Shandong, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Beijing and Liaoning Provinces and accounted for 
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90% of Shanxi’s total outward shipments in 2006. The second largest is Neimeng where a 
total of 120 mmt, accounting for 83% of total outflow shipments, was shipped to Liaoning, 
Tianjin, Heilongjiang, Jilin and Hebei Provinces in 2006. See Table 3 for data on other 
Provinces. 
         When we consider petroleum products they are also shipped throughout China. 
Major Provinces that export petroleum to other Provinces are Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, 
Heilongjiang, Shandong and Xinjiang. In 2006, total outflow shipments of petroleum and 
products was 249 mmt, of which 42 mmt was shipped from Tianjin, 36 mmt from 
Shanghai, 30 mmt from each of Liaoning and Heilongjiang, 24 mmt from Shandong and 
17 mmt from Xinjiang, all of which account for 71% of national total outflow shipment of 
petroleum and products. There are six Provinces that import petroleum and products of 
over 15 mmt from other Provinces. Of 291 mmt of inflow shipments of petroleum and 
products, 39 mmt was shipped to Shanghai, 35 mmt to Liaoning, 26 mmt to Tianjin, 23 
mmt to Guangdong, 19 mmt to Beijing and 15 mmt to Shandong, all of which account for 
54% of the national total inflow shipments of petroleum and petroleum products in the 
same year. 
         China is apparently not rich in natural gas reserves. In fact, there are only a few 
Provinces that export natural gas. The total outflow shipments of natural gas was 18244 
million cubic metres in 2006, while total transportation amounted to 8866 billion cubic 
meters km in conjunction with an average shipment distance of 486km.  The major 
exports come from a few Provinces the largest being Xinjiang (10254 million cubic 
metres), followed by Sichuan and Shaanxi (5300 million cubic metres each), and finally 
 24
Neimeng, Chongqing and Guangdong (3870, 3100 and 2460 million cubic metres, 
respectively). These Provinces account for 95% of the national outflow shipments of 
natural gas in 2006. Although gas is shipped throughout China, the variations across 
Provinces are highly uneven.  In 2006 for example, inflow shipments of natural gas were 
4057 million cubic metres to Beijing, around 3000 million cubic metres to Jiangsu, 
approximately 2000 million cubic metres to Shanghai, and around 1000 million cubic 
metres to Zhejiang, Henan and Gansu. These account for approximately 70% of the 
national inflow shipments of natural gas in 2006. 
          In contrast, electricity generation is widespread with more than 80% of demand met 
within Province, the exception being Beijing where only 35% of demand for electricity 
was met internally. As a result, only 11% of the demand for electricity is transmitted 
inter-provincially. The largest surplus of electricity was Neimeng (coal based) and Hubei 
(hydro-based), each of which exported transmission of approximately 55 billion KWh. 
Other exporting Provinces in 2006 included Shanxi, 43 billion KWh (coal based); 
Guizhou 36 billion KWh (coal based), and Jiangsu 25 billion KWh.  Most of the surplus 
electricity was transmitted to Guangdong (61 billion KWh), Beijing (41 billion KWh), 
and Hebei, Shanghai and Jiangsu (around 30 billion KWh for each), which accounted for 
over 70% of national inflow transmission of electricity in 2006.  
In China there are seven electricity networks; Northwest, Xizang, North China, 
Central China, Southern China, Northeast and East China, and three major electricity 
transmission routes; Northern Route, Central Route and Southern Route. China’s 
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electricity is typically transmitted from West to East and from North to South. Figure 7 
shows China’s electricity networks and transmission routes. 
 
6. Energy pricing informs 
 Energy price reform is an integral part of the overall economic reform package in China. 
Fesharaki et al. (1994) believe that energy prices were ‘irrational’ and caused enormous 
macroeconomic and microeconomic distortions in the energy sector and throughout the 
economy in China. However, the most important and interesting aspect is whether energy 
prices are still irrational and still cause macroeconomic and microeconomic distortions? 
In this section we firstly review the major policies of energy price adjustment and their 
corresponding effects. We will then consider the trends in energy prices for the major 
energy components focusing on the heterogeneity of price levels across Provinces. Finally, 
we use our new results to show how the energy market currently functions in China by 
considering the degree of energy market integration.   
6.1 The characteristic of China’s energy price reform 
Since the early 1980s, China has introduced numerous measures to rationalize oil, coal, 
gas and electricity prices. However, many of the measures were incremental and the scale 
small until 1993. The reason is that the strategy of energy price reforms that China 
adopted was gradual. In the initial years there might be little effort to move the economy 
to one in which resources and factors were allocated according market price signals 
(Huang and Rozelle, 2006). As a result, there were not any losers in the initial years (Lau, 
Qian and Roland, 2000).  
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       Until the reforms of the later 1970s, energy prices were fully state-controlled in China. 
During the early 1980s, China adopted a ‘dual track’ system of energy pricing policy, i.e., 
‘in-plan’ prices and ‘out-plan’ prices. This energy pricing system remained in place until 
1993. ‘In-plan’ energy prices were normally lower than market prices, while ‘out-plan’ 
energy prices were typically market prices. However, in-plan energy prices were not 
always fixed. Most in-plan prices dramatically increased as energy price reform processed 
after 1994 (Wu and Li, 1995). In-plan energy prices were gradually replaced with market-
mediated prices (Hang and Tu, 2007). This prepared the sector for government motivated 
market-oriented energy price reform. 
6.2 Evolution of energy pricing policies 
6.2.1 Coal price reform        
 The market-oriented energy price reform varied in time and in intensity across energy 
type. The ‘dual track’ pricing system for coal was introduced in 1985. Under this policy, 
CGOMs were given an output quota at low price for unified allocation to those important 
state-owned downstream industries such as electricity, steel, metallurgy, engineering, 
chemical and transportation. The LGOMs and TVOMs were also given quota. Coal 
within quotas was referred to as ‘in-plan’ and above quotas was referred to as ‘out-plan’. 
The output above the quotas could be priced 50% higher and the output above more could 
be priced 100% higher than within quotas (Cheng, 1998). 
        As more and more coal was sold on free market, the deliberate low price of ‘in-plan’ 
coal was difficult to sustain. It confronted with great pressure to recover to market level, 
which caused little complain from most of downstream industries because their market 
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and price have been gradually freed. Therefore, price regulation on coal was completely 
abolished after 1994. 
         As electricity tariffs were still tightly controlled, some power plants could not afford 
coal with market price and some coal enterprises refused to sell coal to power plants. As a 
result, a new policy was established in 1996 that the prices of coal sold to power plants 
were guided by central government again and announced at the end of every year. 
However, this policy could not be implemented perfectly because coal producers did not 
fully perform their contracts with many excuses (Wang, 2007). In addition, the contracts 
sometimes aborted due to transportation unavailable. Consequently, the electricity 
industry could not always meet its coal demand under guided prices. Under this 
circumstance, the disputes and blackout happened frequently between coal producers and 
power plants.  
        The bargaining between two parties became even more severe after 2002 when 
government-guided price of coal was once announced to be cancelled but electricity 
tariffs still remained regulated.  This means that coal producers were allowed to determine 
coal price at their will. As a result, only 90 mmt, which was 37% of total amount of 
demand for coal, were contracted at 2002. The central government as a mediator was in a 
dilemma at the first time. Faced with serious power shortage, in April 2003 NDRC gave 
an order, in which the price was just midpoint between requirements of two parties, and in 
2004 government introduced a new coal pricing policy, which was called ‘co-movement’ 
of prices of both coal and electricity. The co-movement is not a free market adjustment 
but regulated and determined periodically by the SDRC to avoid extreme price fluctuation. 
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Adjustment will only be made if fluctuation of coal price exceeds 5%, otherwise, the 
change will be accumulated into the next adjustment period (Ma and He, 2008). 
      China Taiyuan Coal Exchange (CTCE) was established on 18 June 2007 (CTCE, 
2007), which is replace the coal ordering meeting between coal producers and power 
producers. Since then, more freedom would be given to coal suppliers and consumers, 
implying that the toughest reform in China’s energy industry has been settled and a full 
competitive energy market was expected to operate in China. 
6.2.2 Petroleum price reform 
       Petroleum price regulation has experienced four stages. Pre-1981, petroleum prices 
were fully state-controlled. From 1981 to 1994, ‘dual track’ pricing system was adopted, 
while from 1994 to 1998 petroleum prices were market meditated. After 1998, domestic 
petroleum prices have been set in accordance with the international energy market price 
(Hang and Tu, 2007). Meanwhile, central government sets the regional prices of refined 
oil products according to Singaporean oil market and as a result, the 1998 reform had 
domestic oil prices very close to international prices (Wu, 2003). 
6.2.3 Electricity price reform 
Electricity pricing reform is complicated in China. As in other countries, electricity prices 
are not completely deregulated in China, however, the government has made significant 
progress to raise electricity prices to ‘realistic’ market levels since the beginning of 
economic reform.  
      In 1985, electricity tariffs were raised throughout the country. For the first time, locals 
were allowed to raise tariffs to cover the rising costs of coal and transportation (Hang and 
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Tu, 2007). The State Council also encouraged investment in power industry and executed 
multi-tiers of electricity tariffs. In 1987, the government issued a new policy of Fuel and 
Transportation Add-up. It was used as an adjustable surcharge on catalog prices based on 
fluctuations in coal and transportation costs. This pricing adjustment procedure was 
administered and assessed annually by the SDRC. 
      In 1991, a ‘high-in’ and ‘high-out’ policy was introduced, allowing electricity tariffs 
to fluctuate according to coal and other factor costs. In 1993, a ‘new plant-new price’ 
policy was implemented, which allowed all power plants built after 1992 to sell power to 
provincial power companies at debt repayment prices in order to provide sufficient 
revenue for the repayment of loan capital with interest. In the 1990s, a range of surcharges, 
such as ‘Power Construction Fund’, ‘Three Gorge Construction Fund’, were imposed 
(Ma and He, 2008). With these new policies, electricity tariffs have risen rapidly (Lam, 
2004). However, these new policies also resulted in a complicated price structure, leading 
a high regulatory, supervisory and transaction cost.  
       To simplify and control the price, a new price scheme, operation-period price and 
yardstick price, was adopted in 1997. The price under this scheme is based on an average 
social generation cost and a unified internal rate of return on capital over the remaining 
operation period. For present plants, this is indeed an operation-period price while for new 
plants the new scheme actually specifies a unified yardstick price.  
        Some new policies were introduced after 2002. ‘Operation-period price and yardstick 
price’ are still used in regions where competitive regional wholesale market was not 
established after 2002. For regions where competitive wholesale transaction has been 
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introduced, the price consists of two components: capacity price which is determined by 
the government according to the average cost of all generation units in the market, and 
volume price which is determined competitively in the market.  
        On the retail side, the catalog was simplified to include: i) a unit price scheme used 
for residential and agricultural sectors; ii) a two-component price scheme, similar to the 
counterpart on generation side, used by the industrial and commercial sectors; iii) ‘tidu 
jiage’ (a kind of variable price)3 prices were also introduced after 2004; vi) higher prices 
charged for energy-intensive industries (Ma and He, 2008). To reflect rising coal cost, 
‘co-movement’ price of coal and electricity is used for various electricity prices. 
6.3 The changes of energy prices 
 China’s energy prices have experienced several energy policy adjustments during the last 
three decades and the prices of major primary energy sources are apparently converging 
over time. China’s energy prices appear to be rising and dependent more and more upon 
with those in other international markets (Hang and Tu, 2007; Wu, 2003). However, at the 
Regional and Provincial level energy price heterogeneity appears to remains endemic for 
some forms of energy.  
6.3.1 Historical observation 
To illustrate these issues, consider Table 4, which displays the spot prices and their 
changes over time for four major energy fuels in China. Several features can be observed. 
Firstly, energy prices were very stable during the late 1990s. They rose rapidly, however, 
in the new millennium for example, gasoline and diesel prices were below 2500 RMB per 
                                                 
3 This price is a kind of variable price decided based on current quantity consumed and used to encourage or restrain 
electricity consumption. 
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ton in the late 1990s, but they immediately rose to over 3600 and 3300 RMB per ton, 
respectively, in 2000.  They quickly climbed to over 5400 and 4500 RMB per ton by 2005. 
Similar scenarios can be found for coal and electricity. Secondly, prices for coal and oil 
are very consistent with a similar pattern of price change over time. Thirdly, electricity 
prices seem to be an exception. Its price level rose by nearly 55% and changed at a lower 
growth rate (only 4.4%) during the period. This may suggest that electricity prices were 
not consistent with those of other three energy sources or that electricity prices may not be 
cointegrated with those of other three energy sources, as a consequence of government 
control. This is an issue we will return to later.  
        How fast did energy prices changed over time? Are energy price changes consistent 
with other factors of production or the consumer price index? 
        It is useful to compare Chinese trends in energy price changes with those 
internationally and to consider the degree of market integration which is an important 
commitment within the WTO. As coal is the most important fuel in China, we take it as 
an example for comparative purposes.  If we compare the cif price of Japanese steam coal 
imports (BP, 2008) and China’s coal spot price (SDRC, 2006) for the period of 1995-
2005, we find, see Figure 8, that after 1998 the coal prices in Japan and China were very 
consistent despite apparent differences before 1999. This illustrates how China’s coal 
price has converged to that of the international energy market this century. A similar 
pattern of coal price change can be observed between China-Northwest Europe and 
between China-US Central according to BP (2008). 
6.3.2 Across Provinces 
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 It is perhaps not surprising that the levels of energy price and the patterns of price 
changes show considerable variation across Provinces given the significant variations in 
economic growth. Table 5 shows the spot prices in 2005 and the changes from 1995 for 
four major energy sources over 31 Provincial (municipal or autonomous regional) capital 
cities in mainland China. It can be seen from Table 5 that the spot price of coal varies 
considerably and the patterns of price change are also quite different across cities for 
example, the spot price of coal is over 630 RMB per ton in the East (Shanghai and 
Nanjing), while it is below 200 RMB per ton in the West (Lanzhou and Wulumuqi). The 
spot price of coal rose over 3 times in Chongqing, over twice in Taiyuan, and over 1.5 
times in many places from 1995 to 2005. However, the spot price of coal only increased 
by 25% in Haikou and Xian; less than 50% in Nanning, Lhasa and Xining during the 
same period. The spot price of coal actually declined in Lanzhou and Wulumuqi, perhaps 
due to the characteristics of coal itself.  
          However, the opposite pattern can be found for gasoline and diesel. The spot prices 
across cities are at the same levels for both gasoline and diesel at around 5300 and 4300 
RMB per ton, respectively. The price changes are also similar across cities. The price 
almost doubled in all cities during the study period. There are only a few exceptions for 
example, the spot price of gasoline spot price increased by less than 80% in Harbin, 
Wuhan and Changchun, but more than 140% in Lhasa. Likewise, the spot price of diesel 
increased by less than 75% in Chongqing, but more than 130% in Lhasa and Wumumuqi. 
6.4 Energy price integration 
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Following the major reforms of energy price policies over the last two decades, can we 
discern evidence of energy prices convergence across regions and cointegration across 
energy types?   The literature, to date, has been unable to address such questions..  
         To fill this gap, we report some new results on energy price movements using a new, 
high frequency dataset that comprises the market prices of four energy types from 31 
provincial capital cities collected at 10-day intervals over a maximum of 132 months from 
1995 to 2005. We provide results for two key energy input prices, coal and electricity, 
whose price convergence has not yet been reported for China. Our conclusions show that 
the coal market is convergent as a whole in China, but that the electricity market may not 
be integrated as a whole based on the existing electricity network and other relevant 
energy market factors (Ma, Oxley and Gibson, 2007). 
       As discussed previously, the course of market-oriented energy price reform has 
differed both in time and in emphasis across the various energy types. It is possible, 
therefore, that energy prices may not be cointegrated as a whole. Figure 9 describes how 
monthly prices change over the period 01/1995-12/2005 for four major fuels in China. As 
can be seen, energy prices change little for gasoline, diesel and electricity in 1995 and 
1996 because their prices were highly regulated. The price of coal did rise, however, due 
to its early price deregulation. During 1997 and 1998, China’s energy economy could be 
considered as being in a ‘transition period’ during which energy prices fluctuated 
considerably, especially for electricity and gasoline. Since 1999 China’s energy economy 
might be treated as a ‘new regime’ period, which can also be divided into the ‘early 
period’, 1999 to 2001, and the ‘development period’, post 2002. It seems unclear whether 
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China’s energy economy is now experiencing a ‘mature period’ or is still developing.  
There might, therefore, be a period before China’s energy economy is fully integrated and 
reflecting internally driven price changes.   
7. China’s energy efficiency 
Energy intensity is an important indicator of energy efficiency which is directly related to 
economic growth and energy consumption. To ascertain the change in China’s energy 
intensity over time, Figure 10 shows national aggregate GDP (in 1978 price), aggregate 
energy consumption and energy intensity measured as the ratio of energy consumption to 
GDP, since 1978. It appears that energy intensity has generally declined since 1978, 
however, the trend has varied over time.  This may suggest that the rates of energy 
intensity change frequently. It is also clear that since 2000 a different pattern has emerged.  
         If once considers energy intensity by sector, since 1980, see Table 6, one can 
observe some similarities and some differences. Firstly, the patterns of aggregate energy 
intensity shown in Figure 10 and of industrial energy intensity shown in Table 6 are 
consistent as both industrial energy consumption and output (GDP) comprise most of the 
aggregate economy. The similar features of stable yet fluctuating energy intensity can be 
found after 2000 for industrial energy intensity (Table 6). Similar patterns can be 
observed for other sectors. However, more apparent and stronger rising trends appear for 
the other four sectors. For example, intensity rose from 0.64 in 2001 to 0.76 in 2006 for 
the transportation sector; from 0.12 in 2001 to 0.19 in 2006 for the construction sector. 
Whether these rising trends will maintain in the longer period is unclear, in part they may 
depend on any changes in energy policies. 
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          What might have induced the changes in China’s energy intensity? Ma, Oxley and 
Gibson (2008) survey the literature on China’s energy economy and conclude that 
declining industrial energy intensity plays an important role in the decline in national 
aggregate energy intensity before 2000 and that rising industrial energy intensity plays an 
important role in increasing national aggregate energy intensity after 2000. This finding, 
however, does not identify the factors driving the change in energy intensity. To fill this 
gap, Ma et al. (2008) estimate a translog cost function using a panel of provincial data for 
China and they conclude that ‘technological change’ has driven the increase in energy 
intensity and factor prices play little role in this process. Specifically, it is energy-using 
technologies that have been employed in this new millennium in China. If this finding is 
correct, the implications for current policies on technological and capital investment need 
to be seriously analyzed by China’s decision-makers. 
        The changes in energy intensity are also not homogenous across regions, territories 
or Provinces. Table 7 shows Provincial aggregate energy intensity and its changes over 
the period 2001 to 2006 (based on 1978 prices) allowing comparisons to be made between 
Table 6, Table 7 and Figure 10. 
        As can be seen from Table 7 substantial variation in energy intensity, in both the 
levels and changes, can be seen across the Provinces for example, energy intensity is low 
in Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan. These Provinces 
are located in the east and south of China and are part of the developed areas. On the other 
hand, in 2006, energy intensity is relatively high in the less developed area, for example, 
it measures over 1.4 in Guizhou, Ningxia and Qinghai, and about 1.0 in Gansu and 
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Xinjiang. These Provinces are in the the less developed Western region. Energy intensity 
is also greater than 1.0 in Shanxi and Neimeng which are in the less developed Northern 
region. In contrast, energy intensity is less than 0.5 in the developed regions in the East 
and South (e.g., Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Guangdong and Hainan). 
          The trends in energy intensity also vary across the Provinces. Energy intensity 
declined by approximate 50% from 2001 to 2006 in Beijing and by 30% in Tianjin and 
Shanxi. However, it rose by 30% in Fujian and 20% in Shandong, Hubei and Hunan. It 
appears that energy intensity and economic growth are closely correlated. Therefore, 
national energy policies may not be suitable for provincial realities. As a result, provincial 
energy intensity may need to be studied and regional energy policy developed.  
         To improve energy efficiency, many projects have been introduced over the past 25 
years. Price et al. (2001) review China’s energy efficiency policies from 1949 to 2000. 
They explain China’s energy efficiency programs, examine the development of a 
comprehensive energy policy and assess existing energy conservation, regulation and 
policies. However, China’s energy efficiency is still fairly low relative to other developed 
countries and regions. For example, China’s large and medium enterprises consumed 181 
kg standard coal equivalent to produce one ton of cement in 2003, while Japan consumed 
only 128 kg standard coal equivalent in the same year; China consumed 890 kg standard 
coal equivalent to produce one ton ethylene in 2003, while Japan consumed 629 kg 
standard coal equivalent to produce one ton ethylene in the same year; the loss ratio of 
electricity transmission and distribution in Mainland China was 6.8%, but only 4.8% in 
Taiwan in 2005 (CESY, 2007). As a result, energy intensity remained high at about 0.90 
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ton oil equivalent per thousand US$ GDP (measured in 2000 US$ price) in mainland 
China, whereas the world average was only 0.31 ton oil equivalent per thousand US$ 
GDP (measured in 2000 US$ price) post 2002. Mainland China’s energy intensity is 
approximate 3 times higher than the World average. 
 
8. Energy supply, demand and trade 
8.1 Primary energy supply and demand 
8.1.1 Fossil fuel-based energy 
China’s energy production and consumption has increased since 1985 due in the main to 
its high economic growth rate. Table 8 shows China’s energy production and 
consumption as well as its composition. There appear to be three distinct periods ofr 
energy production during the last two decades. During the decade 1985-1995, the growth 
rate of energy production is approximately 4% per annum.  This is followed during the 
period 1995-200 by a period of of stagnation from. From 2000 production soars at an 
annual rate of growth of approximately 9.0%. The composition of primary energy 
production, however, changed little. Coal continues to dominate primary energy 
production with a share of over 76.7% in 2006. The share of oil production has obviously 
declined over time and this has accelerated post- 2000. Natural gas and other primary 
energy production have increased, but with fluctuations. The share of natural gas in 
primary energy supply, for example, remained approximately constant from 1985-1995.  
The growth rates of natural gas share in total primary energy supply varied considerably, 
rising to 8.1% from 1995 to 2000, declined to 2.7% in the next five years and then rose to 
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9.4% post 2005 (Table 8). Other primary energy production shares increased at an 
average of approximately 3% annually. 
          As for the energy consumption, a similar scenario can be found for aggregate 
primary energy consumption and composition. The only difference is that with a higher 
growth rate for aggregate primary energy consumption the role of coal has seen a decline, 
from over 75% in the 1980s and the 1990s approximately to 70% by 2006.   
8.1.2 Hydropower and nuclear energy 
 It can be seen from Table 8 that China’s renewable energy supply is very limited. In spite 
of a high growth rate, the share of renewable energy supply has remained low. In 2006 it 
was only 8% of the total primary energy supply. Of the renewable energies, hydropower 
and nuclear energy are two of the most important for China. China’s hydropower 
production has grown rapidly during the last decade, from 1906 billion KWh in 1995 to 
4829 billion KWh in 2007. This represents an annual growth rate of approximately 8%. 
Nuclear energy has grown even faster from 12.8 billion KWh in 1995 to 62.9 billion KWh 
in 2007, representing an annual growth rate close to 15%.  However, as shown previously, 
the shares of both hydropower and nuclear energy are very small in total electricity 
generation. The former is 14.7%, while the later is less than 2.0% in 2007 (BP, 2008).     
8.1.3 Rural biomass consumption 
         Biomass energy has been playing the most important role in residential energy 
demand of rural China and has made a great contribution to alleviate the pressure of fossil 
energy supply of the country. Rural biomass energy consumption (only including 
firewood, crop stalks and biogas) in mainland China was 206 million tonnes coal 
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equivalent in 2000 and it rose to 280 million tonnes coal equivalent in 2006. Biomass 
energy accounts for overwhelming share in total rural energy consumption. Its share in 
rural aggregate energy consumption was 76% in 2000 and still maintained 74% in 2006. 
Of biomass energy crop stalk accounts for over 60% (CESY, 2007).  
8.1.4 Fossil fuel based energy consumption by industry 
Industry remains the nation’s largest consumer of primary energy. However, as other 
sectors have expanded its share of primary energy consumption has declined from close to 
80% in the 1980s to approximately 70% by 2006 (Table 9). Likewise, agriculture’s share 
of primary energy consumption has also declined from approximately 8% in the mid-
1980s to around 3.5% in 2006. 
         It is worth noting the sharp growth of shares in consumption from the transportation 
and commercial sectors during the last two decades. Transportation was a very small 
consumer in 1985, only 1.5% and the commercial sector close to 1%. However, since 
1985, their shares have grown considerably for example, the share of primary energy 
consumption in the transportation sector increased to 4.5% in the 1990s and then climbed 
to 7.5% by 2006. At the same time, the share of primary energy consumption more than 
doubled from barely 1% in 1985 to 2.2% by 2006 in the commercial sector. It is clear that 
currently these two sectors now account for approximately 10% of the total national 
primary energy consumption.   
        Since 1990, the residential sector has become the second largest consumer of 
primary energy in China. Its share of primary energy consumption was only 5.4% two 
decades ago in 1985.  Five years later, it jumped to 16.0%. Since 1995 when industrial 
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output began to recover the residential share of consumption has been remained stable at 
approximately 10%.  
      By observing growth rates one may be better able understand how the structure has 
changed over time and over sectors (Table 7, bottom section). Some observations can be 
made. Firstly, except for a short period of recovery (1995-2000), a sharply declining share 
of agricultural sector energy consumption has been evident from 1985 to 2006 Secondly, 
a rapidly declining rate only occurred in the 1980s and since then the growth hasn’t 
changed much until 2006 for industry; Thirdly, the construction sector has experienced 
three different phases of growth with effects on its share of energy consumption. The first 
was a sharply declining rate of energy consumption share for the period 1985-1990 to 
1990-1995. This was followed by an extreme move in the opposite direction 1995-2000. 
Since then the situation is one of stability. Fourthly, the transportation sector has also 
experienced three phases of share growth. The fastest growth of share occured during the 
period 1985-1990 (over 25%) followed by high growth 1995-2000 with the third phase 
being no share growth in all other periods; Fifthly, a similar share growth rate pattern can 
be found for the commercial sector where there was first rapid growth, then some decline 
and finally stability post-2000; Finally, the growth of the residential share of energy 
consumption is clearly related to the extraordinarily economic growth (24.3%) that 
occurred during the period 1985-1990. This is clearly unsustainable in the longer term  
  8.1.5 Fossil fuel energy supply and demand across regions 
 China’s primary energy production and consumption varies across Provinces and this 
causes significant domestic trade within China. Table 10 presents data for 2006 on the 
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production and consumption of coal and oil, and the surplus by Province. Firstly, note the 
largest coal producing Province is Shanxi (North) producing approximately 580 mmt., 
followed by Neimeng (North) with approximately 300 mmt., and the third largest are 
Henan (Central) and Shaanxi (West) with approximatelyt 200 mmt. There are several 
other Provinces including Heilongjiang (Northeast), Shandong (East) and Guizhou 
(Southwest), whose coal production is approximately 100 mmt. Secondly, crude oil 
production is very small with many Provinces registering no production. The largest oil 
field is currently located in Heilongjiang (Northeast), with production of 43 mmt , 
followed by Shandong (East) with 30 mmt. Twenty mmt oil fields are found in Tianjin 
(East), Shaanxi (West) and Xinjiang (Northwest) while 10 mmt oil fields are found in 
Liaoning (Northeast) and Guangdong (South). Thirdly, coal and oil are consumed 
throughout China for example, Shanxi and Shandong consume nearly 300 mmt of coal 
and Hebei (North), Jiangsu (East) and Henan (Central) consume approximately 200 mmt 
of coal. There are many Provinces that consume 100 mmt of coal. However, not all 
Provinces consume crude oil. The largest consumer of crude oil is Liaoning (55 mmt), 
followed by Shandong (approximate 40 mmt), and the third is Guangdong (close to 30 
mmt). There are several Provinces that consume 20 mmt of crude oil. Fourthly, it is clear 
that most, but not all, Provinces run a ‘deficit’ of coal for example, Shanxi, Neimeng and 
Shaanxi run a 130-300 mmt surplus while Heilongjiang, Guizhou, Guangxi, Gansu and 
Xinjiang have a surplus of something like 30 mmt. The large coal inflow Provinces are 
Jiangsu, Shandong, Hebei, Zhejiang and Guangdong, with a deficit of between 150 mmt 
to 100 mmt respectively. There are only four Provinces that run a petroleum surplus and 
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they are Tianjin, Heilongjang, Shaanxi and Xinjiang. Liaoning runs the largest petroleum 
deficit (43 mmt) followed by Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shanghai and Ningxia, each of which 
have a deficit of around 20 mmt.  
8.2 Electricity supply and demand 
 Although capacity building in the electricity production sector increased rapidly in China, 
it remains the case that it still cannot meet the rising demand for electricity. China’s total 
installed capacity of electricity supply reached 700 million KW in 2007, of which coal 
power plants accounted for nearly 80% and hydropower stations accounted for nearly 
20%. However, electricity supply is still far behind demand. For example, the excess 
demand for electricity comes from Beijng and Tianjin who had a 1.1 million KW shortage 
of electricity in 2007 (Gao, 2008). China is hastening cooperation with Russia to transmit 
10 million KW of electricity to the Northeast Grid from the Far East Grid, and negotiating 
with Inner Mongolia to transmit 12 million KW to the North China Grid from the Sino-
Inner Mongolia coal powered plants (Gao, 2008). Other forms of foreign-based electricity 
cooperation deals are also under negotiation.  
8.3 Energy trade pattern 
In general, China’s energy imports are quite limited. Until 1996 China was a net exporter 
in term of aggregate energy. Post-1996, China’s aggregate energy imports increased but 
with no obvious trend (Table 11). Only in recent years has a discernable, stable increase 
in net energy imports emerged rising from 53 million tones standard coal equivalence in 
2000 to over 200 million tonnes standard coal equivalence in 2006. This means China’s 
energy import dependence has increased from 3.8% in 2000 to 8.2% in 2006. This pattern 
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of energy trade is determined by two major characteristics of China’s energy supply and 
demand; abundance of coal deposits and rising demand for petroleum.  
        China remains a net exporter of coal, but the surplus is declining. To meet the 
domestic demand for special types of coal, China imports some coal and since 2000 this 
has been increasing in volume of coal import to reach nearly 40 million tonnes standard 
coal equivalence in 2006. On the other hand, the volume of coal exports is still small and 
hasn’t shown an apparent rising trend. As a result, China’s net exports of coal have been 
limited accounting for a small percentage of total domestic coal consumption.  
        When we turn to petroleum, however, the picture is reversed. China’s petroleum 
imports have increased rapidly since 1995 from 37 mmt in 1995 to (98 mmt) in 2000 
more than doubling in 2006 to 195 mmt. When we consider exports we see it has been 
stable at approximate 25 mmt since 1995. China’s reliance on imports of petroleum was 
only 7.6% in 1995. This increased to 33.8% in 2000, rising to almost 50% since then.  
        There is little reason to believe that the pattern of energy trade discussed above and 
presented as Table 11 will continue into the foreseeable future given the current energy 
market situation. Recent volatility in the oil market may lead to some changes, but the 
rapid growth of the residential sector and demand for private vehicles is likely to 
exacerbate China’s reliance on imported petroleum products. China also faces some other 
challenges. Firstly, coal is not a good substitute for oil in despite their abundance of coal 
deposits. Secondly, automobiles or transportation more generally is one of the largest 
consumers of petroleum products in the world. Thirdly, rising domestic petroleum 
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consumption appears unavoidable. Finally, this situation will become more severe if no 
new oil fields are discovered and current oil fields are unable to maintain current output. 
 
9. Looking ahead: challenges and opportunities 
 The factors that affect China’s energy demand and supply have been well documented 
(Zhao and Wu, 2007; Crompton and Wu, 2005). However, what are the factors that drive 
energy demand and supply? We attempt to identify them below. 
9.1 Factors affecting energy demand 
• Income growth. As per capita income grows, consumers will need more energy 
and potentially cleaner energy. At present per capita energy consumption in China 
is relatively low for example, electricity consumption per capita in mainland China 
was 249 KWh in 2006.  This is to be contrasted with (in 2005) 8365 KWh for the 
OECD (All); 11056 KWh in North America; 8482 KWh in OECD (Pacific); 6415 
KWh in OECD (European); and 2596 KWh (World average) (CESY, 2007). 
China’s consumption of electricity per capita is therefore only 25% of the World 
average.  As this consumption raises the demands on China’s production sector 
will become enormous.  
• Urbanization. There remains a substantial rural-urban gap in energy consumption 
per capita in China for example, per capita electricity consumption per capita in 
urban areas was approximate 370 KWh in 2006, while it was only 190 KWh in 
rural areas. In addition, the urban population proportion rose rapidly from 30% in 
1996 to 44% in 2006 (CSY, 2007).  
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• Transportation (including public and private transportation developments). The 
rapid expansion of the transportation sector has inevitably led to an increase in the 
demand for energy, especially oil products (Zhao and Wu, 2007). The total annual 
growth rate of total civil vehicle was 12.2% between 1995 and 2006. The growth 
rate for private vehicle was even faster, whose annual growth rate was 18.2% from 
1995 to 2006, making total private vehicle from 4.18 million in 1995 to 26.20 
million in 2006 (CSY, 2007). 
• Energy pricing. The impact of energy prices on energy intensity has been 
extensively discussed in Hang and Tu (2007). Ma et al. (2008) estimate the 
elasticity of demand for energy. Fan, Liao and Wei (2008) report measures of the 
own-price elasticity at -1.236 for the period 1993-2005. The impacts of raising 
energy prices on energy demand are evident. 
• Energy-intensive exports. China’s energy-intensive exports have significantly 
increased domestic energy consumption. Kahrl and Roland-Holst (2008) estimate 
that net exports accounted for 15-22% of China’s total energy consumption which, 
since 2002, has significantly contributed to the increase in China’s measured 
energy intensity. This suggests that the energy intensity of exports is higher than 
that of non exports. The energy intensity of exports rose 8% annually, almost the 
same rate as national economic growth. Moreover, rising energy-intensive exports 
exaggerates greenhouse gas emissions and in turn China has been to be blame for 
having already become the second largest emitter of greenhouse gas. In fact, 
though within 5 years China’s CO2 emissions have nearly doubled, Weber et al 
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(2008) find that in 2005 around one-third of Chinese emissions (1700Mt CO2) 
were due to production of exports. It is evident that consumption in the developed 
world is driving China’s greenhouse gas emission.  
9.2 Factors affecting energy supply 
• Investment. Total investment in the energy industry was 521 billion RMB in 1995 
(in 2006 prices) and 1751.3 billion RMB in 2006. Over the last decade, the growth 
rate of investment in the energy sector was 11.6% per annum. However, this 
growth rate could not keep in pace with the whole national investment growth. 
The share of investment of energy industry in the whole national investment was 
21.4% in 1995, however, this share decreased to 14.7% in 2006, a one percent per 
year fall since 1995. 
• Innovation. Here we will consider issues related to new energy sources and 
energy supply initiatives. The National Plan for medium- and Long-Term 
Scientific and Technological Development (2006-2010) in written in 2005 raised 
issues relating to innovation in the sector. Dorian and Clark (1987) assessed 
China’s potential for primary energy distribution based on the similarity of 
geographical structure between China and U.S. They suggest ,for example, that 
China’s Gansu, Qinghai Anhui, Sichuan and Chongqing areas are likely to be oil 
rich (Appendix Figure 1). However, nothing has eventuated and the statistics don’t 
show crude oil production in these Provinces (Table 10).  
• Renewable energy. There are various types of renewable energies, of them 
hydropower and nuclear energy are two of most important. As discussed 
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previously, exploitable hydropower is approximate 400 million KW. To date 116 
million KW has been developed. Nuclear energy has developed very slowly in 
China. It accounted for only 2.1% of total electricity supply in 2005 while world 
average for the same period was 15.2% (CESY, 2007). The share of nuclear 
electricity in total electricity generation in many countries is often as large as 40% 
for example, France 80%, Ukraine 48%; Sweden 46%; Belgium 55%; Switzerland 
and Bulgaria 41% (CESY, 2007). In addition, biomass energy even plays a more 
important role in rural household energy demand. For the potential of rural 
biomass resources and consumption, in particular crop residue, see Liu et al. 
(2008). 
• Energy efficiency. With the introduction of many energy efficiency programs, 
China’s energy intensity has been declining during the last two decades. However, 
China’s energy efficiency is low relative to other developed countries and regions. 
As a result, energy intensity is still high in the world (see previous section). It is 
clear that China’s energy supply would have increased by 30% had China’s energy 
intensity been only twice as high as the world average. The potential of improving 
energy efficiency is huge in China. 
• Reforms. Reforms in the energy sector came many forms, which have involved 
both supply and demand. China’s energy economy has been fundamentally 
reshaped following the introduction and implementation of a number of reforms 
(referring to in previous sections). However, a completely competitive energy 
market hasn’t yet been achieved. For example, competitive wholesale markets and 
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retail access are still in the experimental phase. Once fully implemented this may 
produce a significant effect on energy efficiency. In addition, China’s electricity 
prices are still low relative to world averages which may reduce demand side 
efficiencies. Hang and Tu (2007) have modeled the effects of price changes on 
energy intensity and conclude, not surprisingly, that higher energy prices lead to a 
decrease in energy intensity. Increasing energy prices will improve energy 
efficiency and therefore increase energy supply relatively. 
• Traffic congestion. China’s traffic is one of the most congested in the world.  The 
traffic regulation may be also the worst in the world. Improving traffic 
administration may be another way to increase the energy efficiency of the 
transport sector. According to research, only 15% of the energy from the fuel is 
used to move the car. Driving in urban areas, 17.2% of fuel is lost due to idling 
stop lights or traffic congestion (Sophia, 2007). Therefore, the potential to 
improve driving fuel efficiency is significant. 
 
10. Policy directions in energy economic development 
It should be clear that even the most desirable combination of factors discussed above will 
not prevent a significant increase in China’s primary energy consumption and electricity 
generation (Smil, 1998). China’s energy policy makers are really in the dilemma (Khan, 
2005). Choices are inevitable. Chinese policymakers must decide for themselves how and 
what to prioritize. To mitigate China’s energy demand pressure and ease the coal-use-
environment dilemma, in fact, many studies have provide China’s government may 
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valuable policy options. For example, Sinton et al. (2005) present a comprehensive 
valuation of China’s energy straggly options. Combing the contributions made from 
previous studies, this study proposes the following policy directions for the Chinese 
government to consider in the near future:  
• Maintaining and increasing investment in the energy industry.  
• Enhancing technical innovation. Technical innovations come many forms, which 
are involved in both energy supply and demand sides. This also includes 
introducing overseas advanced energy techniques. 
• Coordinating environment and resource policy. China’s energy industry is 
confronted with dual pressures from economic development and environmental 
protection (Chang et al., 2003). Biomass and coal are two of the larges pollutants 
in China. For example, coal combustion produces 70% of China’s carbon dioxide, 
90% of sulfur dioxide emissions and 67% of nitrogen oxide emissions (Sinton et 
al., 2005). Therefore, improving biomass and coal’s combustion efficiency is one 
of the most direct ways to reducing environmental pollution.  
• Coordinating with energy exploitation and conservation. To meet rising energy 
demand doesn’t necessarily mean to have to increase energy supply, while to save 
energy use is also a smarter way to meeting rising energy demand. Therefore, in 
the long-run, China’s government has to make great effort not only to increase 
energy supply but to save energy use as well. Prioritizing investment in energy 
efficiency rather than pouring money into expanding energy supply should be 
strongly recommended. Wang, Wang and Zhao (2008) put forward 13 main 
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barriers to energy saving in China after reviewing literatures on energy saving and 
opinion of experts from energy industry and academia. These main barriers on 
energy saving are worthy of being paid attention from China’s policymakers.  
• Strengthening institutions. Raising the price of energy to reflect national priorities 
will require strengthened institutions with the capacity to make these kinds of 
changes. One possible solution is to establish an independent “Ministry of 
Energy,” which would formalize the government’s commitment to energy issues 
and improve enforcement of energy regulations and could integrate energy 
industry both over regional level and over energy sources, which means that 
energy policies are not independent implemented within each of energy sources 
but considered as a whole energy industry (all of energy sources). 
• Employing Kyoto Protocol for self-defense. During the past two decades, China’s 
exports are mainly energy-intensive based. China’s increasing exports actually has 
been at the expense of depletion of domestic energy resources though exports are 
one of the most important drivers of fast economic growth in China. It may be 
impossible for China’s government to choose between economic growth and 
resource conservation at this stage. However, China should request Kyoto parties 
to count the incremental cost of environment protection within the framework of 
the Clean Development Mechanism and would allow some of the importers of 
China’s carbon-intensive goods to invest in lowering the carbon intensity of 
Chinese exports. The reason appears simple because importers of China’s 
commodities benefit a lot. For example, Li and Hewitt (2008) find that through 
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trade with China the UK reduced its CO2 emissions by approximately 11% in 
2004. Shui and Harriss (2006) estimate that that US CO2 emissions would have 
increased from 3% to 6% if the goods imported from China had been 
manufactured in the US while 7%–14% of China’s current CO2 emissions were a 
result of producing exports for US consumers during 1997-2003. 
• Increasing investment in renewable energies. Renewable energies only account for 
less than 10% of the world’s total energy consumption but nearly 20% of China’s 
total primary energy consumption (Chang et al., 2003). The potential of renewable 
energies is enormous due to its unlimited supply and its cleanliness in use. 
Moreover, once the Kyoto Protocol is fully implemented by all the signatories, the 
incentive of using renewable energies will be greatly increased. The opportunities 
and challenges for renewable energy policies can refer to Zhang et al. (2008). 
• Improving traffic administration techniques and reforming traffic regulation. 
• Increasing international energy cooperation and joint ventures.  
 
11. Conclusion  
The above discussion brings about a comprehensive overview of China’s energy 
situation in the new millennium. As cane bee seen, China’s energy situation is quite 
dynamic, in some degree, which is apparently dependent upon the energy policy. 
Continuing fast economic growth inevitably drives energy demand increase. With the 
feature of coal as major primary energy resource, there are a series of challenges 
Chinese government have to meet. With increasing demand for clean energy, large 
 52
quantity of funds needs to be invested in the generation of electricity and environment 
protection facilities. Increasing exports also significantly drive the rapid increase in 
domestic energy demand, and in return drive greenhouse gas emissions.  
        China’s industrialization, modernization and urbanization have affected the way 
in which energy resources have been and will be used to facilitate economic growth 
(Dean, 1974). China’s future in political, economic and human terms is of enormous 
importance to the world. The decisions that China makes in relation to its energy 
policy will present both challenges and opportunities for the world.  
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Table 1. Present new installed capacity and its percentage of total capacity (million ton each year and million kw) 
Year Coal exploitation Crude oil exploitation Coal power plant Hydropower station 
 Capacity Δ% Capacity Δ% Capacity Δ% Capacity Δ% 
1993 42.8 3.7 6.9 4.8 9.4 6.6 4.0 9.4 
1994 9.5 0.8 6.2 4.3 8.1 5.2 4.2 8.3 
1995 23.3 1.7 7.4 4.9 10.7 6.4 3.7 7.1 
1996 16.9 1.2 9.0 5.7 13.6 7.4 3.7 7.1 
1997 30.0 2.2 12.5 7.8 10.3 5.3 3.7 6.8 
1998 9.7 0.8 8.4 5.2 15.4 7.9 6.2 10.8 
1999 23.5 2.2 9.5 5.9 12.8 6.0 9.1 16.0 
2000 22.6 1.7 9.2 5.6 13.4 5.8 4.5 7.3 
2001 14.9 1.3 15.6 9.5 10.1 4.1 3.4 4.3 
2002 34.2 2.5 25.4 15.2 33.2 12.0 5.2 6.5 
2003 74.4 4.5 17.2 10.1 21.4 6.5 12.7 16.1 
2004 154.4 7.8 24.7 14.0 37.0 9.9 11.1 11.3 
2005 183.8 8.3 23.9 13.2 52.8 12.4 12.8 11.6 
2006 226.5 9.5 16.0 8.7 80.2 16.2 13.0 10.7 
Average:         
1990s 22.2 1.8 8.6 5.5 11.5 6.4 4.9 9.4 
2000s 101.5 5.1 18.9 10.9 35.4 9.6 9.0 9.7 
Note: Coal power capacity was estimated by total coal electricity generation divided by 24 (hour/day)*200 (day/year) and hydropower 
capacity was estimated by total hydro electricity generation divided by 24 (hour/day)*150 (day/year).  
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007. Beijing: China Statistical Publisher. 
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Table 2. The volume of interprovincial coal shipment in 2006, million metric tonnes 
Province Outflow 
shipment 
Inflow 
shipment 
Total 
shipment 
% of total 
consumption 
Beijing 3.9 26.9 30.8 90 
Tianjin 0.0 37.8 37.8 87 
Hebei 28.9 173.3 202.2 75 
Shanxi 431.6 39.5 471.1 153 
Neimeng 145.4 17.9 163.3 95 
Liaoning 5.4 77.8 83.2 51 
Jilin 4.7 51.8 56.4 71 
Heilongjiang 35.1 11.5 46.6 50 
Shanghai 1.8 53.3 55.0 95 
Jiangsu 7.1 158.1 165.2 81 
Zhejiang 0.0 112.1 112.1 96 
Anhui 30.8 35.5 66.2 70 
Fujian 2.1 31.4 33.5 59 
Jiangxi 3.0 20.9 23.9 47 
Shandong 28.1 187.9 216.0 70 
Henan 83.3 49.9 133.2 60 
Hubei 0.0 82.9 82.9 80 
Hunan 8.3 34.8 43.1 42 
Guangdong 0.0 98.1 98.1 85 
Guangxi 10.6 36.7 47.3 102 
Hainan 0.0 2.4 2.4 68 
Chongqing 5.5 3.1 8.6 21 
Sichuan 19.2 20.3 39.5 41 
Guizhou 29.2 0.0 29.2 28 
Yunnan 6.1 8.3 14.4 16 
Tibet - - - - 
Shaanxi 80.0 0.0 80.0 104 
Gansu 9.1 10.4 19.5 44 
Qinghai 0.0 3.8 3.8 38 
Ningxia 11.1 14.2 25.3 70 
Xinjiang 2.5 0.4 2.9 6 
Note: Physical unit. Average distance of rail shipment was 760 km in the last decade. 
Data source: China Energy Statistical Yearbook 2007. Beijing: China Statistical 
Publisher.  
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Table 3.  Major domestic railway coal shipment by origins and destinations in 2006 
Origin Coal shipment 
(mmt) 
Of total outflow 
(%) 
Major destinations  
(Provinces) 
Shanxi 390 90 Hebei, Shandong,, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Beijing 
and Liaoning 
Neimeng 120 83 Liaoning, Tianjin, Heilongjiang, Jilin and 
Hebei 
Henan 69 83 Hubei, Jiangsu, Shandong, Jiangxi and Anhui 
Shaanxi 66 83 Hubei, Jiangsu, Shandong and Henan 
Heilongjiang 34 99 Liaoning and Jilin 
Hebei 23 81 Tianjin and Jilin 
Shandong 20 74 Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
Guizhou 18 64 Guangxi 
Anhui 16 55 Jiangsu 
Data source: China Transportation Yearbook, 2007. Beijing: China Statistical Publisher. 
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Table 4. National aggregate energy price 1995-2005  
Year Coal 
(¥/ton)  
Electricity 
(¥/KWh) 
Gasoline 
(¥/ton) 
Diesel 
(¥/ton) 
1995 214 38 2772 2293 
1996 231 38 2773 2306 
1997 264 40 2876 2612 
1998 260 45 3240 2451 
1999 247 46 2870 2530 
2000 241 48 3640 3305 
2001 240 50 3685 3229 
2002 261 51 3571 3177 
2003 283 54 4154 3516 
2004 366 56 4730 3913 
2005 414 58 5455 4501 
1995-2005:     
% change 93 54 97 96 
% growth rate 6.8 4.4 7.0 7.0 
Data source: calculated by taking the average of 10-day interval spot price time series 
published by State Development and Reform Committee of China. 
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Table 5. Fuel prices and change (%) from 1995 by provincial capital cities 
Provincial 
capital city 
Coal  
(¥/ton) 
Electricity  
(¥/KWh) 
Gasoline 
 (¥/ton) 
Diesel  
(¥/ton) 
 2005 Δ% 2005 Δ% 2005 Δ% 2005 Δ% 
Beijing 408 172 63 87 5345 88 4373 93 
Tianjin 370 114 62 56 5486 96 4533 123 
Shijiazhuang 387 165 56 33 5469 101 4533 106 
Taiyuan 389 227 45 88 5534 116 4549 109 
Huhehaote 296 104 52 29 5491 96 4539 98 
Shenyang 397 61 61 131 5357 103 4556 99 
Changchun 475 147 67 86 5270 87 4323 90 
Harbin 321 69 56 100 5107 79 4432 94 
Shanghai 632 150 71 27 5544 102 4513 94 
Nanjing 634 141 68 15 5292 118 4077 90 
Hangzhou 501 75 72 30 5502 108 4430 93 
Hefei 559 136 57 81 5333 90 4554 94 
Fuzhou 523 87 65 6 5592 83 4435 84 
Nanchang 374 58 58 95 5297 82 4489 94 
Jinan 552 115 56 182 5395 109 4579 112 
Zhengzhou 370 123 50 102 5330 85 4566 99 
Wuhan 426 106 57 32 5210 81 4406 93 
Changsha 490 87 59 36 5367 92 4411 94 
Guangzhou 467 69 72 29 5422 102 4361 106 
Nanning 369 41 56 135 5476 84 4517 83 
Haikou 370 10 60 22 5779 109 4576 86 
Chongqing 537 327 57 92 5666 99 4570 74 
Chengdu 358 99 58 123 5631 119 4518 116 
Guiyang 313 148 49 -32 5614 92 4606 86 
Kunming 411 183 50 61 5682 97 4606 93 
Lhasa 370 50 56 88 6410 143 5242 129 
Xian 245 24 52 9 5390 97 4501 100 
Lanzhou 168 -17 48 28 5440 96 4556 98 
Xining 241 46 42 190 5099 83 4557 102 
Yinchuan 270 132 47 12 5404 93 4504 108 
Wulumuqi 135 -24 48 99 5082 99 4360 138 
Data source: calculated by taking the average of 10-day interval spot price time series published by State 
Development and Reform Committee of China. 
 
 65
 
 
Table 6.   The Changes of national energy intensity by sector 
Year Agriculture Industry Construction Transportation Commerce 
1980 0.44 1.98 0.54 1.41 0.20 
1985 0.25 1.62 0.43 1.11 0.11 
1990 0.25 1.38 0.29 0.86 0.16 
1991 0.25 1.27 0.28 0.81 0.15 
1992 0.24 1.12 0.25 0.79 0.15 
1993 0.22 1.00 0.20 0.77 0.19 
1994 0.22 0.91 0.18 0.72 0.17 
1995 0.23 0.87 0.16 0.67 0.17 
1996 0.23 0.81 0.16 0.62 0.18 
1997 0.23 0.72 0.13 0.71 0.17 
1998 0.21 0.63 0.16 0.70 0.17 
1999 0.21 0.55 0.13 0.70 0.18 
2000 0.20 0.50 0.13 0.70 0.17 
2001 0.21 0.44 0.12 0.64 0.17 
2002 0.22 0.48 0.13 0.67 0.17 
2003 0.21 0.49 0.12 0.72 0.18 
2004 0.23 0.53 0.21 0.75 0.20 
2005 0.23 0.52 0.19 0.74 0.19 
2006 0.23 0.52 0.19 0.76 0.19 
Note: energy intensity (ton/¥1000) = energy consumption (10k ton)/GDP (¥100 million 
in 1978 price). 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook 1996-2007, China Energy Statistical Yearbook 
2007. Beijing: China Statistical Publisher. 
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Table 7.  Aggregate energy intensity over Provinces in 1996, 2001 and 2006 and change 
% Change 
Province 1996 2001 2006 
1996-2001 2001-2006 
Beijing 0.97 0.66 0.35 -32.0 -46.7 
Tianjin 0.97 0.69 0.49 -28.9 -29.4 
Hebei 1.11 0.81 0.88 -26.8 7.6 
Shanxi 2.26 1.96 1.34 -13.3 -31.6 
Neimeng 1.23 1.15 1.10 -6.5 -4.7 
Liaoning 1.33 0.93 0.81 -30.2 -12.6 
Jilin 1.34 0.83 0.73 -38.1 -12.2 
Heilongjiang 1.05 0.74 0.66 -29.5 -10.3 
Shanghai 0.71 0.51 0.41 -27.5 -20.7 
Jiangsu 0.58 0.41 0.41 -29.7 0.0 
Zhejiang 0.50 0.42 0.40 -16.0 -6.5 
Anhui 0.83 0.68 0.54 -18.1 -20.0 
Fujian 0.40 0.32 0.42 -19.6 30.2 
Jiangxi 0.61 0.47 0.47 -23.4 0.5 
Shandong 0.66 0.46 0.56 -30.3 21.1 
Henan 0.78 0.64 0.61 -17.8 -4.2 
Hubei 0.87 0.57 0.67 -34.7 18.2 
Hunan 0.89 0.51 0.61 -42.9 21.2 
Guangdong 0.51 0.42 0.36 -18.2 -15.0 
Guangxi 0.56 0.52 0.54 -6.1 2.9 
Hainan 0.38 0.42 0.41 9.3 -2.1 
Chongqing 0.00 0.75 0.64 - -15.4 
Sichuan 0.96 0.67 0.68 -30.1 1.6 
Guizhou 2.20 1.79 1.45 -18.9 -18.7 
Yunnan 0.80 0.74 0.78 -7.9 6.2 
Tibet 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - 
Shaanxi 1.29 0.77 0.61 -40.1 -20.3 
Gansu 1.69 1.18 0.98 -29.8 -17.1 
Qinghai 1.63 1.35 1.40 -17.4 3.5 
Ningxia 1.78 0.00 1.86 -100.0 - 
Xinjiang 1.52 1.03 0.94 -32.3 -9.1 
Note: calculated based on 1978 price, ton/¥1000. 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook and China Energy Statistical Yearbook. Beijing: China Statistical 
Publisher. 
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Table 8. China’s energy production and consumption (million ton standard coal) 
Year Aggregate  Of  which,  % 
 Production  Coal Oil Natural gas Others 
1985 855.5  72.8 20.9 2.0 4.3 
1990 1039.2  74.2 19.0 2.0 4.8 
1995 1290.3  75.3 16.6 1.9 6.2 
2000 1289.8  72.0 18.1 2.8 7.2 
2005 2058.8  76.5 12.6 3.2 7.7 
2006 2210.6  76.7 11.9 3.5 7.9 
Growth rate annually (%) 
1985-1990 4.0  0.4 -1.9 0.0 2.2 
1990-1995 4.4  0.3 -2.7 -1.0 5.3 
1995-2000 0.0  -0.9 1.7 8.1 3.0 
2000-2005 9.8  1.2 -7.0 2.7 1.4 
2005-2006 7.4  0.3 -5.6 9.4 2.6 
 Consumption  Coal Oil Natural gas Others 
1985 766.8  75.8 17.1 2.2 4.9 
1990 987.0  76.2 16.6 2.1 5.1 
1995 1311.8  74.6 17.5 1.8 6.1 
2000 1385.5  67.8 23.2 2.4 6.7 
2005 2246.8  69.1 21.0 2.8 7.1 
2006 2462.7  69.4 20.4 3.0 7.2 
Growth rate annually (%) 
1985-1990 5.2  0.1 -0.6 -0.9 0.8 
1990-1995 5.9  -0.4 1.1 -3.0 3.6 
1995-2000 1.1  -1.9 5.8 5.9 1.9 
2000-2005 10.2  0.4 -2.0 3.1 1.2 
2005-2006 9.6  0.4 -2.9 7.1 1.4 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1996-2007. Beijing: China Statistical 
Publisher. 
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Table 9. Shares of aggregate energy consumption by sector in China 
Year Agriculture Industry Construction Transportation Commerce Others Resident 
1985 7.7 79.7 1.7 1.5 0.9 3.0 5.4 
1990 4.9 68.5 1.2 4.6 1.3 3.5 16.0 
1995 4.2 73.3 1.0 4.5 1.5 3.4 12.0 
2000 4.4 68.9 1.5 7.3 2.2 4.2 11.5 
2004 3.8 70.5 1.6 7.4 2.4 3.9 10.5 
2005 3.6 71.0 1.5 7.4 2.2 3.9 10.4 
2006 3.4 71.1 1.5 7.5 2.2 3.9 10.3 
        
Growth rate annually (%) 
1985-1990 -8.6 -3.0 -6.7 25.1 7.6 3.1 24.3 
1990-1995 -3.0 1.4 -3.6 -0.4 2.9 -0.6 -5.6 
1995-2000 0.9 -1.2 8.4 10.2 8.0 4.3 -0.8 
2000-2005 -3.9 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.0 -1.5 -2.0 
2005-2006 -5.6 0.1 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 -1.0 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1996-2007. Beijing: China Statistical Publisher. 
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Table 10. Provincial balance of coal and oil in 2006, million ton 
Province Production Consumption Surplus 
  Coal Crude oil Coal Crude oil Coal Crude oil 
Beijing 6.5 - 30.6 8.0 -24.1 -8 
Tianjin - 19.4 38.1 9.0 -38.1 10.4 
Hebei 83.6 6.1 213.5 10.5 -129.9 -4.4 
Shanxi 581.4 - 283.5 - 297.9 - 
Neimeng 297.6 - 161.9 1.4 135.7 -1.4 
Liaoning 73.7 12.3 142.1 55.6 -68.4 -43.3 
Jilin 30.0 6.8 75.5 9.5 -45.5 -2.7 
Heilongjiang 102.8 43.4 90.3 18.5 12.5 24.9 
Shanghai - 0.2 51.4 18.3 -51.4 -18.1 
Jiangsu 30.5 1.9 184.3 23.0 -153.8 -21.1 
Zhejiang 0.2 - 113.3 21.1 -113.1 -21.1 
Anhui 83.3 - 88.3 4.5 -5 -4.5 
Fujian 19.3 - 54.0 3.8 -34.7 -3.8 
Jiangxi 27.8 - 45.9 4.2 -18.1 -4.2 
Shandong 140.7 27.6 290.0 38.8 -149.3 -11.2 
Henan 195.3 4.9 210.0 7.0 -14.7 -2.1 
Hubei 11.2 0.8 96.5 8.5 -85.3 -7.7 
Hunan 59.5 - 94.4 5.7 -34.9 -5.7 
Guangdong - 13.4 111.3 28.1 -111.3 -14.7 
Guangxi 6.8 - 41.7 1.2 -34.9 -1.2 
Hainan - 0.1 3.3 2.3 -3.3 -2.2 
Chongqing 39.9 - 37.3 - 2.6 - 
Sichuan 86.0 0.2 85.3 1.7 0.7 -1.5 
Guizhou 118.2 - 99.4 - 18.8 - 
Yunnan 73.4 - 74.8 - -1.4 - 
Tibet - - 74.0 14.9 -74 -14.9 
Shaanxi 182.6 19.9 39.6 13.2 143 6.7 
Gansu 39.5 0.8 9.1 1.1 30.4 -0.3 
Qinghai 6.9 2.2 34.9 1.7 -28 0.5 
Ningxia 32.7 - 44.4 18.1 -11.7 -18.1 
Xinjiang 43.2 24.7 30.6 8.0 12.6 16.7 
Data source: China Energy Yearbook 2007. Beijing: China Statistical Publisher. 
 
 70
 
Table 11. Export and imports and trade reliance of China’s energy, million metric tonnes and %   
Year  Aggregate trade and reliance Coal trade and reliance Petroleum trade and reliance 
 Import Export Balance Reliance Import Export Balance Reliance Import Export Balance Reliance 
1980 2.6 30.6 -28.0 -4.6 2.0 6.3 -4.3 -0.7 0.8 18.1 -17.2 -19.7 
1985 3.4 57.7 -54.3 -7.1 2.3 7.8 -5.5 -0.7 0.9 36.3 -35.4 -38.6 
1990 13.1 58.8 -45.7 -4.6 2.0 17.3 -15.3 -1.4 7.6 31.1 -23.5 -20.5 
1995 54.6 67.8 -13.2 -1.0 1.6 28.6 -27.0 -2.0 36.7 24.5 12.2 7.6 
1996 68.4 75.3 -6.9 -0.5 3.2 36.5 -33.3 -2.3 45.4 27.0 18.4 10.6 
1997 99.6 76.6 23.0 1.7 2.0 30.7 -28.7 -2.1 67.9 28.2 39.7 20.2 
2000 143.3 90.3 53.1 3.8 2.2 55.1 -52.9 -4.0 97.5 21.7 75.8 33.8 
2004 265.9 116.5 149.5 7.4 18.6 86.7 -68.1 -3.5 172.9 22.4 150.5 47.5 
2005 269.5 114.5 155.1 6.9 26.2 71.7 -45.6 -2.1 171.6 28.9 142.8 43.9 
2006 310.6 109.3 201.3 8.2 38.3 63.3 -25.0 -1.0 194.5 26.3 168.3 48.2 
Growth rate annually: 
1980-1990 17.6 6.7 - - 0.0 10.6 - - 25.2 5.6 - - 
1990-2000 27.0 4.4 - - 1.0 12.3 - - 29.1 -3.5 - - 
2000-2006 13.8 3.2 24.9 13.7 61.0 2.3 -11.7 -20.6 12.2 3.3 14.2 6.1 
1997-2006 15.6 4.4 27.3 19.3 38.7 8.4 -1.5 -7.7 14.6 0.1 17.4 10.2 
Note: Aggregate energy is measured in million ton standard coal and reliance is the percentage of net import in total domestic consumption. 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbooks. Beijing: China Statistical Publisher. 
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Figure 1. China’s coal reserve distribution in 2004 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005, Beijing: China Statistical Publisher. 
Note: According to BP (2008), China’s proved reserve of anthracite and bituminous coal 
is 62200 million tonnes, and proved reserve of sub-bituminous and lignite coal is 52300 
million ones. The total proved coal reserve is 114500 million tones and accounts for 
13.5% of world total. The ratio of reserves to production is 118 at the end of 2007.
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Figure 2. China’s petroleum reserve distribution in 2004 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005. Beijing: China Statistical Publisher. 
Note: China’s proved reserve of oil is 2116.6 million tonnes and accounts for 1.3% of 
world total; the ratio of reserves to production is 11.3 at the end of 2007 (BP, 2008).  
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Figure 3. China’s natural gas reserve distribution in 2004 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005. Beijing: China Statistical Publisher. 
Note: China’s proved reserve of natural gas is 1.9 trillion cubic meters and accounts for 
1.1% of world total. The ratio of reserves to production is 27.2 at the end of 2007 (BP, 
2008).
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Figure 4. Old government structure and regulatory system for energy sector setup in 1993 
 
Note:  
(1) SSPC - State Planning Commission 
(2) SETC - State Economic Trade Commission 
(3) SSTC - State Science Technology Commission 
(4) CNPC – China National Petroleum Corporation 
(5) Sinopec - China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
(6) MEP – Ministry of Electric Power 
(7) MCI – Ministry of Coal Industry 
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Figure 5. New government structure and regulatory system for energy sector after 1998 
Note:  
(1) MLR – Ministry of Land and Resources 
(2) SETC - State Economic and Trade Commission 
(3) SDRC - State Development and Reform Commission 
(4) SACI – State Administration of Coal Industry within (2) 
(5) SAPC – State Administration of Petroleum Corporation within (2) 
(6) SERC – State Electricity Regulatory Commission 
(7) PGOM – Provincial government owned mines 
(8) LGOM – Local government owned mines 
(9) TVOM – Township and village owned mine enterprises. 
(10) CNPC – China National Petroleum Corporation (responsible for onshore oil and gas 
exploration and production in the north and west of the country) 
(11) Sinopec – China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (responsible for much of the 
oil refining and distribution in the south and east of the country) 
(12) CNOOC – China National Offshore Oil Corporation (responsible for all offshore oil 
and gas operations). 
(13) Big Five - Huaneng Group, Datang Group, Huadian Corporation, Guodian Co. and 
Power Investment Co.  
(14) IPP – Independent Power Plant. 
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Figure 6. China’s coal transportation routes 
Note: Red lines represent raw coal transported from West to East. 
          Blue lines represent raw coal transported from North to South. 
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Figure 7. China’s three major electricity transmission routes 
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Figure 8. Japan steam coal import cif price and China’s coal spot price 1995-2005 
Note: exchange rate of US$ to RMB is 7.0 
Data source: BP 2008 and National Development and Reform Committee, PRC. 
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Figure 9. Monthly price change patterns of four major fuels 01/1995-12/2005. 
Note: Price unit for coal, gasoline and diesel is RMB/ton and price unit for electricity is 
RMB/1000 KWh.  
Data source: calculated by taking the average of 10-day interval spot prices of 35 major 
cities published by State Development and Reform Committee of China.
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Figure 10. National GDP (billion, 1978 price), aggregate energy consumption (million ton 
standard coal), and aggregate energy intensity (ton/1000 yuan) 
Note: left hand y axis is for GDP and energy consumption, and right hand y axis is for 
aggregate energy intensity. 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook. Beijing: China Statistical Publisher. 
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Appendix Figure 1. China’s Provinces with high petroleum potential. 
Extracted from Dorian and Clark (1987), Figure 2. 
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Appendix Figure 2. China’s Provinces with high natural gas potential. 
Extracted from Dorian and Clark (1987), Figure 3. 
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Appendix Figure 3. China’s Provinces with high coal potential. 
Extracted from Dorian and Clark (1987), Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
